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Abstract. 
The Soviet development of the capacity to strike American soil in retaliation for any American 
nuclear use in defence of its European NATO allies plunged the Atlantic Alliance into a 
profound crisis in the 1960s.  Strategists on both sides of the Atlantic feared that in future the 
USA would be more reluctant to use its nuclear weapons to defend Europe.  Several European 
states felt the need to develop their own or collective European nuclear weapons free from the 
veto power of the USA.  NATO would have fallen apart had it not been for American and British 
deployments of tactical (or non-strategic) nuclear weapons on allied territory, the joint 
development of strategies for their use in the Nuclear Planning Group, and their virtual 
application in NATO exercises.  The French went all the way to acquire their own nuclear 
arsenal and never fully committed to using it in defence of their allies.  Nevertheless, French 
strategists also argued for a tactical use of nuclear weapons – especially the neutron bomb – to 
repel Warsaw Pact forces if necessary.  Many arguments of the Cold War are valid, but acquire 
new dimensions with the extreme reduction of the British arsenal and questions about British and 
American commitments to Europe, as the wording of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty do 
not amount to a nuclear guarantee.   
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
[The Americans] had the peculiar habit in Washington to think that missiles that could only hit 
Hamburg or Bonn or Frankfurt or London or Paris for that matter, ought to be regarded as 
tactical affairs and not as strategic. They had the peculiar habit of calling strategic only such 
weapons which could hit their own soil and their own cities and I said to them well the first . . . 
so-called battlefield nuclear weapons which hits people on German soil for the German nation is 
a strategic event. 
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 19871 
 
 
Debates over tactical nuclear weapons, and particularly debates regarding their role in deterring 
aggression at conventional and strategic levels, did not finish with the end of the Cold War. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and its constituent parts continue to grapple with 
how best to deter Russia and reassure allies, especially along NATO’s eastern border.2  For these 
reasons, NATO could revisit the question of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. In other parts of 
the world, too, nuclear weapons are active issues.  With this is mind this analysis of Europe’s 
dilemmas over tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War can provide some guidance based 
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on Europe’s historical experiences.  In arguing for retaining American non-strategic nuclear 
weapons [NSNW] in Europe, Petr Suchy and Bradley Thayer have identified five reasons for the 
desirability of such weapons:3  
 They strengthen deterrence by holding out the possibility of denying an adversary 
physical advances into NATO territory.  
 They may deter an adversary from using his own NSNW. 
 They bridge the gap between conventional forces and strategic nuclear weapons. 
 If used, they would be used for actual military destructive purposes, “tactically”, a role 
that previously made them known as Tactical Nuclear Weapons [TNW].4 
 They are a symbol of United States commitment to Europe’s defence.5 
It is important to note that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not constitute a nuclear 
guarantee, as signatories merely state their determination, to take such action as each 
individually “deems necessary” on the day if allies are attacked.6  To create at least the option of 
nuclear use, and a visible link between this option and the defence of Europe, US nuclear 
weapons have been stationed in Europe since the Berlin crisis of 1948/1949.  Suchy and Thayer 
conclude by pleading for the continued stationing of American NSNW in Europe, arguing that 
several of these reasons retain validity. This exegesis analyses the origins of these arguments. 
Looking back at the Cold War, debates within NATO primarily revolved around the 
possible use of TNW/NSNW.  Apart from demonstrating the limits of faith in the alliance based 
on the willingness of any government to risk its nation’s survival for collective deterrence, the 
debates revolved around reasons similar to Suchy and Thayer’s.  Largely, the following 
questions capture their essence: 
I.If unable to defend with purely “conventional” weapons, would one be prepared to fight 
geographically restricted nuclear war in Europe rather than surrender to an invasion by the 
Warsaw Pact states?  The use of nuclear weapons in such a geographically restricted way 
was “tactical nuclear use”, hence the term Tactical Nuclear Weapons. 
II.Did NATO need a “seamless garment” of nuclear weapons, with reaches from the 
battlefield alone to deep strikes into Soviet territory, to demonstrate the credibility of 
NATO’s deterrent posture?7  A variation of this question was whether NATO needed 
somehow to counter-balance quantitatively and qualitatively all nuclear weapons in the 
Soviet arsenal.
8
   
III.Could TNW use somehow end a war, short of battling with the Warsaw Pact forces, and 
without escalating to all-out nuclear war?  NATO’s “nuclear theologians” came up with 
the idea of a “warning-shot” – or “shot across the bows” – to signal willingness to escalate 
to nuclear war, yet in the hope that this would restore deterrence and lead the adversary to 
break off the attack. 
IV.If the thought of defending NATO Europe with TNW that had many times the explosive 
yield and fall-out of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unacceptable, was there a less 
destructive alternative form of nuclear weapons?   
V.(a) Was it desirable to have American “Theatre Nuclear Forces”9 based on European soil, 
assuming that Americans would be more likely to use them than “strategic” nuclear 
weapons stationed in America – or at sea?  And how to ensure that the Americans did not 
use them either too early, too late, or on targets of which the Europeans would not 
approve? 
(b) Was it more credible to have European nuclear weapons based on European soil, 
independent of an American veto?  If the latter, to what extent were European nuclear 
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weapons states willing to share the control or even decisions on the targeting of these 
weapons with other Europeans?  In other words, would anybody but the French see 
French nuclear weapons as a more reliable deterrence to a Soviet attack against West 
Germany than American ones?  
 Sketched below are European answers to these questions.  For reasons of space, there is 
selective concentration on Cold War arguments put forward in Britain, France, and West 
Germany, without any pretence of having covered all views put forward in these three countries.  
 
Theme (I): TNW in NATO Europe in the Cold War 
 To set these in context, from its formation in 1949, NATO constituted a defensive 
grouping backed by American nuclear weapons intended as a deterrent against aggression by the 
Soviet Union and its manpower-rich satellites – from 1955 onwards, the Warsaw Pact.10  There 
was thus never any question in NATO of using TNW for conquest.  Under President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, battlefield weapons were to supplement NATO’s 
conventional forces for deterrence of or defence against Warsaw Pact aggression.  With the 
Warsaw Pact perceived in the West as commanding a massive numerical superiority in 
conventional forces over NATO, the United States supplied a range of nuclear weapons as a 
cost-effective military counter-weight.  By early 1961, approximately 3,900 American nuclear 
weapons were on European soil; by May 1965, the figure had grown to 5,950; by September 
1966 around 7,000; and by 1968, where it peaked, 7,161.  In 1980, America unilaterally 
withdrew 1,000 warheads, then all atomic demolition munitions, and eventually surface-to-
surface missiles [SSM] of the shortest ranges.11  These two categories also counted as TNW, as 
they complemented American “strategic” nuclear forces, i.e. land based missiles in the United 
States, bombs on American bomber forces, and submarine-based Polaris missiles.  American 
missiles based on European soil – referred to as Theatre Nuclear Forces – with a range that 
included the western Soviet Union, were seen as something in-between the categories of tactical 
and strategic.  Successively called Medium-Range and then Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, 
America could have used all these weapons in extremis against circa 1,860 Communist Bloc 
targets through the Single Integrated Operational Plan, which would easily have resulted in 
several hundreds of millions of deaths.12  Implementation would only occur if NATO had to fend 
off such an attack from the Warsaw Pact conventionally or with TNW. 
 European governments generally welcomed the stationing of American nuclear weapons 
on European soil.  The assumption shared by all NATO member-state governments and 
expressed both in public and secret NATO documents and declarations was that these weapons 
strengthened deterrence of any Warsaw Pact aggression or, should that fail, help NATO fend off 
a Warsaw Pact attack.  Nevertheless, since the late 1950s, there were anti-nuclear movements in 
several NATO countries and, when in opposition, even some major political parties demanded 
the abolition of nuclear weapons either through negotiated multilateral disarmament or even 
through unilateral nuclear divestment.  Obviously, it also meant opposing the deployment of 
American nuclear weapons in Europe. This opposition, coupled with endemic anti-Americanism 
in some quarters – by the far Left or extreme nationalists – remains the backdrop to this issue 
during the Cold War.  
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Theme (II): All ranges of nuclear weapons, and the need to counterbalance the Soviets? 
 First deployed in Europe in the 1950s were American short-range – “battlefield” – TNW.  
Intermediate-Range SSM – Thor in the Britain, Jupiter in Turkey and Italy, and Mace and 
Pershing in Germany – complemented them between 1960 and 1963.  Of these, Thor and Jupiter 
could target the Soviet Union.  Even so, they were often still referred to by Americans as 
“tactical”, as they were stationed “in theatre”, that is in Europe rather than the United States. 
 West Germany did not deploy Thor and Jupiter due to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's 
political scruples about targeting the Soviet Union from German soil, although early on there 
was talk of an Intermediate or Medium Range missile to be stationed in Germany.
13
  Instead, 
West Germany bought Pershings, deployed from 1962 with a range only of about 400-450 
kilometres – less than the distance to the Soviet borders.
14
  As early as 1964, negotiations got 
under way for West Germany to acquire a new variety of Pershings – Pershing I, later known as 
Pershing Ia – with a slightly longer range of around 700 kilometres allowing targeted locations 
well beyond East Germany and yet still well short of Soviet territory.
15
  The warheads remained 
in American custody.  In addition, from 1962, 96 first-generation American Mace B cruise 
missiles were deployed in West Germany fully under American control.  With a range of up to 
2500 kilometres, they were capable of reaching Moscow and Leningrad but were withdrawn in 
1969.
16
  Thereafter, Pershings were the longest-range missiles deployed in West Germany, but, 
to repeat they could not reach Soviet territory.   
 From 1969, Soviet-American arms control focused on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
[SALT], and multilateral talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions focused on 
conventional arms. The Bonn Government felt particular concern about neglect of the “grey 
area” between them and strategic nuclear forces – TNW.
17
  Meanwhile West German strategists 
began to express concern about what they saw as a gap in the medium ranges of the Western 
arsenal.   
 West Germans feared that having only American-based strategic nuclear or battlefield 
nuclear weapons for use against Warsaw Pact forces that had already penetrated NATO territory 
– and thus on NATO territory, that is in West Germany, but also Norway, Turkey, and Greece – 
signalled the existence of a “fire-break” between the United States and – especially – German 
soil.   In 1965 if not earlier, German strategists made the argument for a continuous spectrum – 
later referred to as a “seamless garment” – of nuclear weapons,
18
 a theme reiterated frequently in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  They pleaded for acquiring TNW to bridge the gap.
19
  The 
British supported this request, putting it to the Americans in August 1977 in a famous letter 
drafted by Michael Quinlan, the key civil servant in charge of nuclear matters in the Ministry of 
Defence intermittently until the mid-1990s, and signed by the defence secretary, Fred Mulley.
20
 
 Although NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe periodically engaged in 
a “Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study”, before the mid-1970s there had been no 
comprehensive evaluation of its nuclear stockpile.  The approximately 7,300 TNW assigned to 
NATO, mainly by America,21 were believed necessary for the “assurance of destruction” of both 
mobile and fixed targets.  The ratio of battlefield targets to strike forces was estimated at around 
2:1, with about 876 warheads – 12 percent – allocated to nuclear surface-to-air missiles and 
nuclear depth charges or bombs.  There were 1,400 “critical targets”, 1,000 of which were to be 
covered by NATO-assigned forces – the rest by American strategic forces.  As both the United 
States and Soviet Union had sufficient strategic systems to serve their national targeting plans, 
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the number of TNW was considered by Britain’s Chiefs of Staff to be “more a matter of political 
than military judgement”.22   
 Britain’s contribution to NATO’s deterrence posture consisted of 140 Vulcan bombers 
that could reach Moscow, with WE-177 gravity bombs plus, from 1968-1969, four submarines 
with Polaris missiles with a maximum of two likely on patrol at any time.23  The Americans 
committed 900 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, 350 submarine-based Polaris missiles, and 
1,130 long- and medium-range bombers to NATO’s defence.24  Of these, the United States Air 
Force’s 170 F-111s, all based in Britain, could reach the Soviet Union.  In the early 1980s, 
Tornados would replace the Vulcans, which had been developed during the 1950s.  The former 
had a much shorter range and could not target the Soviet homeland without in-flight refuelling.   
 France did not assign its nuclear forces to NATO command; it withdrew from NATO’s 
integrated military structure in 1966, jealously guarding its own nuclear forces for the defence of 
its “vital interests” alone – a term left deliberately vague.  Occasionally, to deflect criticism by its 
European NATO allies, Paris would vaguely claim that French nuclear weapons by virtue of 
being in Europe extended deterrence to Europe.  However, until today, France does not interpret 
its treaty commitments enshrined in the 1948 Brussels treaty – confirmed in 1954 and folded into 
the EU’s 2010 Lisbon Treaty – as a commitment to defend its fellow-signatories with nuclear 
weapons.25  
 Meanwhile, NATO’s intelligence assessment (MC 161/74) of 1974 had emphasised:  
that the Warsaw Pact regard nuclear weapons as a normal part of their armoury, which 
they could use in a pre-emptive role, and that NATO use of nuclear weapons would 
carry great risk that the Soviet Union, which apparently does not subscribe to a strategy 
of graduated response, might escalate abruptly in scale, nature of target, area or any 
combination of these. The possibility should not, however, be discounted that this is 
what the Warsaw Pact wishes NATO to believe.26 
From releases from former Warsaw Pact states’ archives, this assessment of their military 
doctrine appears to be substantially correct.27  Nevertheless, in the 1970s and early 1980s, NATO 
officials28 generally under-estimated the Pact’s commitments to an aggressive nuclear doctrine.  
Basing themselves on assessments conducted over many years and agreed upon multilaterally, 
NATO believed that if it  
used nuclear weapons, the Soviets would at least initially limit their response to the 
theatre concerned and that in any conflict in which Warsaw Pact forces became 
involved they would, while taking all necessary measures to prepare for escalation, 
probably seek vigorously to limit the conflict and to end it through political means . . . 
the Warsaw Pact could well respond “in kind” . . . both sides seeking to obtain political 
or military advantages in preparation for subsequent attempts to seek a political 
resolution of the conflict but acting with a degree of restraint in view of the risk  of 
escalation. In practise the Warsaw Pact leaders might observe something akin to a 
doctrine of graduated response . . . .29 
NATO officials were therefore basing their assessments of the consequences of nuclear use on 
the tacit belief that both sides would respect “the rules of the game”. This was of course not an 
evidence-based assumption as thankfully no such crisis had occurred.   
 In any case, London shared Bonn’s desire for weapons of all reaches and positions in the 
NATO arsenal.  Quinlan contended that what NATO really wanted was the “capability for deep 
strike amongst one of its options in its bag of clubs”.30  It came forward through an American-led 
study group within NATO,31 which produced the “Integrated Decision Document” and formed 
the basis for the “Dual Track Decision” of December 1979.32   
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The SS-20 and the Dual Track Decision 
 This Decision had two roots.  One was the perceived imbalance of NATO and Warsaw 
Pact TNW.  The Honest John, Sergeant, and Pershing Ia missiles available on the Central Front, 
together with atomic demolition munitions and nuclear artillery, were quite adequate for British 
purposes – that nuclear signalling should be as inoffensive as possible and thus primarily on 
NATO territory.  Tactical aircraft – the American Starfighter F-104 and later the F-111, based 
mainly in Britain – suited West German preferences of targeting territory well east of East 
Germany.  In the mid-1970s, the USA stationed shorter range Lance SSMs with a range of 70-
120 kilometres in West Germany.  However, after scrapping the Thors and Jupiters as part of the 
secret settlement ending the Cuban Missile Crisis, then Mace at the end of the 1960s, NATO’s 
European arsenal did not contain ground-launched missiles that could reach Soviet territory in 
the way that Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 ballistic missiles could reach Western Europe.   
 Then from 1976, the Soviet Union deployed a new mobile SSM in Europe: the SS-20 
Saber.  As NATO had no SSMs of the same range, NATO could not have responded 
symmetrically to Soviet nuclear use of these weapons, which some American and European 
strategists thought highly problematic – others like Quinlan did not.33  SS-20 missiles provided 
the Soviets with the capacity to strike NATO bases pre-emptively.  Offensively, they also had 
the supersonic Tupolev Tu-22 bomber and Sukhoi Su-24 fighter-bomber, equivalent of the 
American F-111.  The British Ministry of Defence noted that “Politically [these systems] have 
greatly heightened Western public awareness of the big and increasing lead which the USSR has 
in long-range [Theatre Nuclear Forces] targeted on Western Europe . . . not constrained by SALT 
[the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the SALT II Treaty signed in June 1979 
between the Americans and Soviets]’.34  This provided the strategic context for NATO’s 
December 1979 decision to modernise its long-range in-theatre capability. 
 The West Germans worried greatly about the on-going modernisation of Soviet Theatre 
Nuclear Forces.35  West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt told President Jimmy Carter and 
his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski: 
that given the perspective of the future political weight of these SS-20s it was in my 
view indispensable, absolutely necessary to include these missiles into the SALT II 
talks which were under preparation and hadn’t really started but which the Carter 
administration wanted to get going with the [Leonid] Brezhnev administration in 
Moscow . . . .36 
 In October 1977, in a lecture to the London security community, Schmidt emphasised the 
need for Western Europe to respond on each level of the “escalation ladder” whether through 
tactical nuclear weapons, “sub-strategic” forces – like those carried on aircraft or through 
medium-range missiles – and finally at a strategic level.37  Schmidt thereby set a trap in which he 
caught himself by claiming there was an imbalance of Theatre Nuclear Forces and conventional 
forces in Europe and arguing for the need for a balance of forces.
38
 The public seized upon an 
argument involving numbers.  It could easily be manipulated to show that, in fact, there was 
equality if one counted British and French nuclear-armed submarines, the three multiple re-entry 
vehicles on certain missiles as three, not one, warheads, and so on.
39
  Moreover, the Soviet 
Union could show that it had consistently deployed nuclear weapons of this range in Europe 
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since the early 1960s, and that the SS-20 merely replaced obsolescent missiles.
40
  The linkage 
between SS-20 and the Euromissiles was thus controversial. 
 On 12 December 1979, NATO thus decided to “modernise” NATO’s longer range 
Theatre Nuclear Forces whilst proposing to desist if the Soviet Union withdrew its SS-20 east of 
the Urals – hence, the “‘Dual Track”.  Achieving the former was to occur by deploying new 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe: comprising 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles to 
replace the existing 1,000 American Pershing IA, and 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles 
[GLCMs], each with a single warhead.41  Pershing II had a range of 1,100 miles; the GLCMs 
1,500 miles and a promised accuracy measured in tens of metres, a major improvement in 
precision that would allow its use with greater confidence that a designated target would be hit 
and reduce collateral damage.   
 The insistence on parity undermined the subsequent arms control negotiations between 
the Soviets and Americans by focusing on their respective Intermediate-Range Nuclear  Forces, 
which in 1987 led to a symmetric withdrawal of the American Theatre Nuclear Forces from 
Europe, and Soviet ones to east of the Urals.  Valid or not, the aspiration to some sort of parity is 
a persistent theme, but by no means one shared by all European strategists.   
 
Theme (III): Last Warning - the Rationale for Pre/Sub/Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons  
 A different approach altogether to parity is the idea that the design and if necessary use of 
nuclear weapons stationed in Europe should be a last warning-shot or “shot across the bows”. 
This was the other root of the Dual Track decision.  From 1949 until the early 1960s, NATO 
doctrine held that in the event of Soviet-led aggression, NATO would use all its nuclear weapons 
as soon as possible, under a doctrine of massive retaliation.42  From 1968, however, NATO 
strategists hoped they might not have to take recourse to its entire arsenal, especially city-
targeting “strategic” weapons.  Instead, it hoped that a “shot across the bows” might lead the 
aggressor to desist from his attack and agree to an armistice. 
 An American defence analyst, Warren Amster, first articulated the idea in the mid-1950s 
that one would want to “reconstitute deterrence” even if it had initially failed.  Also known as 
“intra-war deterrence”, he argued that American first use of nuclear weapons should not aim to 
defeat the Warsaw Pact, but make it stop in its tracks.43  In 1961, British civil servants in a study 
known as the Mottershead Report came up with the idea that a first use of nuclear weapons by 
NATO should not be dominated by military-tactical, battle-winning aims; the political-strategic 
goal of bringing about an armistice should.  The underlying assumption was bold.  First, NATO 
strategy assumed that the Kremlin would not retaliate with nuclear weapons because it did not 
actually want nuclear war and would see the error of assuming that it might get away with a 
purely conventional conquest by force.  Second, it assumed that, once their forces suffered a 
nuclear response, Soviet leaders could back down without committing – political – suicide.44 
 NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] espoused this concept in 1969 when it adopted 
the “Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons” [PPGs] – 
the more refined “General Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons in the 
Defense of NATO” [GPGs] adopted only in 1986 remained very similar in spirit.  Thus also why 
by the mid-1970s, the number of non-strategic weapons deployed in Europe was considered by 
the Britain’s Chiefs of Staff to be “more a matter of political than military judgement”.45  An 
NPG study had shown that the introduction of the tactical nuclear weapons then deployed by 
NATO forces “cannot be counted on to offset conventional weakness”.   Defeating aggression by 
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the numerically superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact by using nuclear weapons 
tactically for military effect was an illusion.46  Yet, as British practitioners put it in 1976, 
“despite the NPG’s valuable work . . . NATO’s Theatre Nuclear Force posture is largely a 
hangover from the 1950s”.47  It took from 1961 until 1969 before NATO adopted the best part of 
Mottershead Report reasoning and, then until 1979, before deciding to acquire the nuclear 
weapons needed to implement the preferred British strategy. In the interim almost “twenty years 
of blind incrementalism” had taken place.48   
 The first delay – 1961-1969 – resulted from difficulty in finding any common 
denominator or strategic principles for both the Americans and the Europeans. Coupled with it 
was a growing desire on the part of the American defense secretary, Robert McNamara, and his 
immediate successors to enhance American security by capping the arms race between the 
superpowers.  Against the background of this preoccupation in Washington, it was all very well 
for the Europeans to try to edit NATO strategy: the hardware implementation, which only 
America could provide, simply did not follow.49  The second delay – 1969-1979 – is more 
puzzling as the United States, especially under the influence of Defense Secretary James 
Schlesinger, supported deploying Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.  Moreover, the technology 
for more precise targeting was becoming available:  the rationale of limited nuclear strikes 
demanded precision and as little collateral damage as possible so as not to make the other side 
desperate.   
 
French views 
 In the meantime, by developing a French bomb, first tested in 1960, with free-fall bombs 
available from 1964, President Charles de Gaulle patiently pursued his goal of making France 
independent from an American nuclear umbrella in which he had no confidence.  It allowed 
France to leave the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966.  Henceforth Britain was the 
only European nuclear power with nuclear weapons committed to the Alliance.  De Gaulle 
refused to engage in consultations on the purposes of nuclear use, stressing doctrinal differences 
on nuclear-use doctrine.  He and his chief nuclear strategists, generals Pierre Marie Gallois and 
Lucien Poirier, stressed their total disagreement with American strategic ideas mooted in the 
early 1960s that sought ways to defeat a Warsaw Pact assault on NATO Europe by conventional 
means only.  Gallois and Poirier clung to NATO’s older tenet that there could not be any limited 
– that is, conventional – war with the Soviet Union,50 and that nuclear weapons of all sorts and 
ranges had to be used as early as possible to fend off the numerically superior Warsaw Pact 
forces.  America’s other European NATO allies equally rejected any idea of trying to hold out 
against the Warsaw Pact with only conventional forces.   
 If a purely conventional defence of Western Europe was unacceptable and if strategic 
nuclear-use – the incineration of major Soviet cities – should be avoided in the hope that the 
conflagration might be stopped short of all-out nuclear war, the question remained as to how 
NATO would first use nuclear weapons.  Here the paradox emerged: both NATO’s NPG and, de 
facto, de Gaulle’s chief of staff in the late 1960s, General Michel Fourquet, recoiled from the 
prospect of a “tactical nuclear battle”.  Instead, for Fourquet, the test or warning-shot idea of 
using nuclear weapons was very attractive, essentially for the same reasons given by Amster, the 
Mottershead Report, and the PPGs, with only limited military effects.51  French official circles 
vehemently denied the convergence of thinking, but it must have been clear to see for all 
involved in these matters.52   
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 France acquired its own short-range nuclear forces, the mobile Pluton, that could move 
forward towards the inner-German border; deployed from 1974; in 1993, it was supposed to be 
replaced by the equally mobile Hadès with a slightly longer range.  The air-delivered standoff 
missile, Air-Sol Moyenne Portée [ASMP], later complemented these successive short-range 
SSMs.  In keeping with Fourquet’s reasoning, the weapons, emphatically called pre-strategic, 
emphasised that they were not to be used in attempts to win a battle on the ground with nuclear 
weapons.  The numbers deployed – 200 – however, as the Germans liked to emphasise, pointed 
more towards a readiness to give battle than to administer a warning-shot.  Moreover, the 
Germans pointed out that Pluton and even Hadès, fired from France, would have detonated on 
West German soil – unless brought forward to the inner-German border, in which case they 
targeted East Germany.  Seen from Bonn, they looked rather like battlefield – that is, “tactical” – 
nuclear weapons than pre-strategic ones. 
 The French president after 1981, François Mitterrand, eventually reaffirmed that only two 
forms of use – a “pre-strategic” last warning and strategic city bombing – must exist, a doctrine 
still upheld today.53  As this concept matched that of the GPGs, divergences at most concerned 
the numbers needed.  In the early 1980s, NATO scenarios exercised biannually in the NATO-
wide command post exercise, WINTEX, moved towards limited first use.  WINTEX 1979 had 
foreseen the use of 40 weapons, backed by another 20;54 but in WINTEX 1981, the British War 
Cabinet asked for employment of at most 20 weapons, one-half of what NATO’s supreme 
commander had sought.55  At such a small number, British thinking – prevailing in the exercise 
scenario – coincided with the French declaratory doctrine.  NATO eventually settled on a 
semantic compromise: in the mid-1990s, in the context of negotiations with Russia. It substituted 
the term “non-strategic nuclear use” for “tactical nuclear use” – instead of the French “pre-
strategic”.56 
 It is not without irony that post-Cold War Russia abandoned the Soviet – supposed57 – 
no-first-use doctrine and embraced what it calls “de-escalatory nuclear use”.  The difference to 
NATO’s posture again lies in numbers:  it seems that Russia would contemplate using far more 
than the 20-40 missiles mentioned in WINTEX scenarios.58  
 
Theme (IV): The Neutron Bomb 
 If the use of the existing TNW on NATO soil was too horrible to contemplate, was there 
a technological alternative?  An answer emerged in the 1970s with the development of enhanced 
radiation weapons – the neutron bomb – with significantly less lingering radiation and less 
immediate blast power: its main effect consisted of short-term radiation lethal to living 
organisms, able to penetrate protective surfaces.  In short, assuming the evacuation of local 
populations before an enemy invasion, it would have killed invading enemy soldiers leaving a 
greater proportion of infrastructure intact. 
 The new precision-guided missile technology of the 1970s made possible the 
combination of a much reduced blast and radioactive yield with improved accuracy.  It gave new 
life to plans to introduce the neutron bomb, invented in 1958 and first tested by the Americans in 
1963, but now proposed for procurement by the Gerald Ford and Carter administrations in the 
United States during the mid-1970s.   
 Against this background, Schlesinger put forward his eponymous doctrine with its 
provision for different targeting options.  It roughly coincided with the introduction of  France’s 
Pluton and aircraft-carried free-fall bombs.  Just as nuclear debates within NATO returned to the 
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theme of greater credibility of deterrence through wider warfighting options, under President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – 1974-1981 – France espoused a nuclear doctrine aiming to defeat 
oncoming enemy forces with TNW on the battlefield.  Giscard proclaimed in 1976 that the 
tactical nuclear arsenal was “not just an instrument of deterrence, but also an instrument of 
battle.”
59
  In latter half of the 1970s, he and his chief of the General Staff, General Guy Méry, 
clearly wanted tactical weapons in a potential war-fighting role.60  It was also clear to French 
strategists that the 200 Pluton were rather too much for a mere “shot across the bows”.61   
 Proponents argued that the neutron bomb fitted this war-fighting role and would give 
French deterrence posture greater credibility.62  In one of the rare cases of Western strategists’ 
interest in Soviet doctrine, the French government designated Colonel Marc Geneste to travel 
throughout NATO to make soundings about the neutron bomb.  He drew on available knowledge 
about Soviet strategy to prove that it would be foolish to forego the option of battlefield use of 
tactical nuclear weapons if the Warsaw Pact had incorporated them firmly into its strategy.63  
 The split between supporters and opponents of the neutron bomb cut across the political 
parties.64  Key members of the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République like Jacques Chirac 
or Léo Hamon were now prepared to contemplate moving away from the signalling doctrine and 
supported the introduction in quantity of neutron bombs as weapons of “barrage”.65  Meanwhile 
the signalling school made their opposition to any such adulteration of France's doctrine heard.66  
In early 1978, two decades after the United States, France conducted its first neutron bomb test.
67
  
It was thus very embarrassing for Giscard when later in 1978, Carter decided unilaterally to call 
off the American neutron bomb project.
68
  France publicly fell in line behind the United States 
and, towards the end of 1978, the French Ministry of Defence denied that France was 
contemplating the acquisition of neutron bombs.
69
  Giscard and Méry, and later Chirac, now 
renounced not only the neutron bomb project but the doctrine of the nuclear battle.70  A 
government publication of 1979, written for the armed forces, stated that French nuclear strategy 
was:  
specific to France because it establishes a direct link between the threat to employ or the 
employment of the tactical nuclear weapon and the unleashing of strategic reprisals.  It 
thus differs from the Russian and American concepts that to the contrary try to dissociate 
tactical nuclear use from strategic [nuclear use].71 
 Then, in August 1981, the new American president, Ronald Reagan, re-opened the option 
of American neutron bomb production.  Several French strategists who initially opposed the 
neutron bomb changed their opinion in arguments about the greater credibility of a non-strategic 
nuclear use option, for example Colonel – later General – Guy Lewin, a member of the Centre 
for Advance Planning and Evaluation,72 and General Pierre Gallois.73  In 1982, Mitterrand, spoke 
in favour of integrating tactical nuclear weapons into conventional forces to make an actual 
battlefield defence of France more feasible – and hence credible.74  Mitterrand ultimately 
abandoned this idea at German requests, and Pluton’s successor, Hadès, was only briefly 
deployed, and neutron bomb warheads never fitted.  Yet ever since, even after the end of the 
Cold War, there are claims that France needs tactical nuclear weapons to strengthen its 
conventional forces.75   
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Theme (V.a): Dual Key Arrangements and Consultation 
 From America’s point of view, there was an advantage in deploying American-owned 
weapons in, and potentially fired from, NATO Europe.  This was always based on the 
assumption that the Soviets did not want to escalate nuclear war to a strategic inter-continental 
exchange, and that they would thus not retaliate with nuclear strikes against America.  The 
thinking was that American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe were thus less likely to invite 
preventive nuclear counter-force strikes against American territory.  At the same time, the ability 
to launch from Europe – with the agreement of Allied host state governments – showed alliance 
solidarity and the intention of strengthening deterrence.  
 Some American nuclear weapons in Europe went to NATO countries under “dual key” 
arrangements with the majority owned and operated by the Americans.76  The British, along with 
several other NATO states, had some of these American-owned TNW with the warheads held 
under this “dual key” command and control system, with the British also deploying their own 
TNW in West Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In the 1950s, Britain began equipping 
the British Army of the Rhine, numbering around 55,000 troops, with American tactical nuclear 
weapons held in American custody.77  These also included battlefield howitzers, deployed in 
Europe between 1953 and 1991, the M-31 Honest John – 1954-1982 – MGM-5 Corporal – 1955-
1966 – and MGM-29 Sergeant – 1963-1977 – all of which by the end of the 1950s were also 
capable of delivering conventional ordnance or chemical and biological agents.78   
 Although the fully British-owned contribution of nuclear weapons to NATO’s arsenal 
was relatively small, it nevertheless provided that the Americans “consult” the British on nuclear 
use in the joint targeting arrangements that, in turn, gave London a way to influence the 
American strategic posture.  Moreover, consultation was at the base of all “dual-key” 
arrangements.  Most American nuclear warheads in Europe remained under dual-key 
arrangements under so-called bilateral Programs of Co-operation and stockpile agreements.  
After the experiments of the 1950s and 1960s, with pre-delegation abandoned, by the 1970s and 
1980s, the United States instead maintained positive control over all of their forces in peace and 
war with only the American president – and at least one other senior American official – able to 
release them for use. Arrangements were in place to consult with America’s allies – “time and 
circumstances permitting”.  The weapons themselves were subject to the “two-man rule” 
whereby American personnel could only release the weapons following presidential 
authorisation through military channels.  Additionally, all-American nuclear weapons deployed 
in Europe were fitted with coded devices known as Permissive Action Links that physically 
prevented use without authorisation.79 
 In this environment, the Lyndon Johnson Administration wanted to allay feelings in Bonn 
that West Germany was being “singularised” in view of its exposed geographic position and 
insufficient protected.  To address these issues and decrease pressures from NATO’s Non-
Nuclear Weapons States, a December 1966 proposal by a special committee of defence ministers 
led the North Atlantic Council to “approve certain arrangements for nuclear planning”.80 
Following on, two new policy-making bodies – the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and the 
NPG – were established along with the adoption in 1968 of “flexible response” – in its third form 
of “flexible escalation” of MC 14/381 – with the ensuing 1969 PPGs essentially a compromise 
strategy borne out of years of heated debate.  NATO and the United States periodically re-visited 
the issue, but the 1969 compromise essentially held until the end of the Cold War. 82   
 When NATO decided to deploy the Euromissiles in 1979, France, outside both the 
integrated military structure of NATO and the NPG, nevertheless tried to make its influence felt 
on the subject that was, after all, of concern to Paris.  Typically, two views emerged.  Some 
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French strategists wondered whether deploying cruise and Pershing II missiles would finally and 
totally decouple the American strategic nuclear arsenal from Europe and thus erode deterrence.  
Others feared it would make some American nuclear use – from European launch pads – more 
likely and thus deterrence more credible.83   
 After the neutron bomb project was finally buried, Geneste and most its other former 
defenders favoured American deployment of cruise and Pershing II “Euromissiles”,84 even 
though neutron bombs and Euromissiles had very different purposes. Conceived for barrage, the 
neutron bomb was to fend off the advancing enemy on the battlefield at a range of 30-120 
kilometres from French forces – and thus most likely on West German territory; meanwhile 
Euromissiles were to take out targets well into Warsaw Pact territory.85  It was far easier for Paris 
to support Euromissile deployment – the missiles were neither French nor stationed on French 
territory – than to take a decision on neutron bomb procurement.  In addition, the euromissiles 
could be recognised as having a mission very like the “last warning-shot” of the French “pre-
strategic” forces, particularly airborne ones.  There was continuity between Giscard’s and 
Mitterrand’s support for the Euromissiles.86  Mitterrand even felt it appropriate, in 1983, to 
lecture the German Bundestag on the desirability of Euromissile deployment.  When they were 
scrapped after the 1987 Soviet-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty– the 
French agitated to bring their own air-launched stand-off nuclear missile, the ASMP, to the 
attention of Europeans who thought this gap in NATO defences pernicious, but without being 
taken up by any of their neighbours.87   
 
Theme (V.b). European Alternatives 
 Already doubtful of Washington’s willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend 
European allies, and in pursuit of European integration, the Bonn government in the mid-1950s 
had supported European co-operative alternatives to an American nuclear defence, alternatives of 
which both the United States and Britain were deeply suspicious.88  The idea underlying the 
creation of a Multilateral [European Nuclear] Force [MLF] was to give non-nuclear NATO 
powers access to jointly manned surface ships or a submarine on board with American nuclear 
weapons.89  The existential question that ultimately sank the fleet was whether to launch these 
weapons against Warsaw Pact targets without American approval.  The answer, ultimately, was 
“no”.  Britain and de Gaulle’s France between them scuppered the MLF, as they regarded it 
dangerous to their respective national interests.90   
 The desire to divert Bonn from the nuclear path was also one of the main drivers for 
Britain’s NATO policy during this period.  Although Adenauer had signed a unilateral 
declaration in 1954 not to build nuclear weapons as part of the settlement admitting them to the 
Western European Union and NATO, it did not rule out future repudiation of these self-imposed 
treaty obligations.91  The same applied to Italy, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.  Bonn 
was always conscious that the “absence of German possession and control of nuclear weapons 
was a deficit in West Germany’s ability to guarantee its own security”.  Tactical nuclear weapons 
operated on West Germany’s behalf through NATO – by the Americans and British – in part 
remedied this deficit.92   
 Periodically, France advocated other weapons as particularly reassuring for its 
neighbours, usually when France tried to enlist these neighbours’ financial investment in one of 
France’s expensive nuclear programmes.93  Thus, some French strategists enthusiastically argued 
that a French neutron bomb would enhance “European” deterrence strength.94  Supporting the 
13 
 
 
neutron bomb thus usually meant by extension advocating closer links with NATO or at least 
with strengthened European co-operation.  With all other missiles gone from European soil in the 
1990s, France again argued that its Rafale aircraft with its ASMP was the only system left to fire 
a last “warning-shot” at oncoming forces.  At the time, however, a Russian attack on NATO 
territory seemed so unlikely that there was no interest in other European states.  Revival of this 
subject may easily occur in the post-2017 context. 
 
Dénouement: from the mid-late 1980s and the end of the Cold War 
 The irony was that the dénouement of the Cold War began with the withdrawal of the 
Euromissiles, referred to as INF from the mid-1980s, precisely those weapons had become so 
important to NATO’s strategic compromise and central to its nuclear strategy.  Following 
Mikhail Gorbachev's emergence as Soviet leader in March 1985, significant disagreement 
emerged between Reagan and the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, over Reagan’s 
apparent commitment to the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.  The Soviet-American 
superpower summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, and the Gorbachev-Reagan declaration that 
they hoped to work towards a nuclear-free world, seemed a great blow to London’s and Bonn’s 
defence interests.95   
 At Reykjavik, Reagan proposed eliminating all strategic nuclear forces – bombers, long-
range cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles – within five years and strategic ballistic missiles 
within ten years. Gorbachev counter-proposed the elimination of all strategic forces by the end of 
that ten-year period.  Although the Soviets agreed not to seek further inclusion of British and 
French deterrents from future INF negotiations, Thatcher’s reaction to Reykjavik was  “as if 
there had been an earthquake beneath my feet”.96  The “double zero” option for INF also jarred 
with the purely military defence interest of West Germany: eliminating weapons of 500-5,500 
kilometre reach undermined the GPGs for the first and follow-on use of nuclear weapons by 
NATO adopted earlier in 1986, which seemed all but forgotten by the Americans by the end of 
that year!97   
 Whilst Thatcher remained keen to hang on at least to short-range nuclear forces – under 
500 kilometres in reach – these were the weapons the Bonn government disliked most, arguing 
that they “singularised” German territory – and thus Germans – for nuclear war and its effects.  
The adage of the day was “the shorter the weapons, the deader the Germans”.  German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl warned in 1987 that there must not be “zones of reduced security” in 
Europe, when NATO had emphasised solidarity and shared risk for so long.
98
  Thatcher recorded 
in her memoirs that “this question – the avoidance of another ‘zero’ on SNF [Sort-range Nuclear 
Forces] – . . . was to divide the alliance so seriously in 1988-9”.99 
 The British government was isolated on these issues when the new George Bush 
Administration in 1989 also placed SNF modernisation on the negotiating table.  That summer, 
the collapse of communism in central and Eastern Europe heralded the end of the Cold War and 
political events in large measure overtook debates over arms control. After the collapse of 
communism in Russia, Bush and the new Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, proceeded to 
negotiate the removal of most NSNW from Europe.  
 In France in 1987, Mitterrand eventually chose to back the Soviet-American Treaty 
eliminating the INF, which increased the strains between him and the Chirac government with 
which the Socialist, Mitterrand, had to have “cohabitation” after a general elections had returned 
a conservative majority.
100
  Mitterrand was strongly criticised from many sides.
101
  His decision 
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after the end of the Cold War not to deploy Hadès and the decision of the next President, Jacques 
Chirac, to scrap the system ended the French debate on tactical nuclear weapons.
102
  Today, 
France has four nuclear-powered Le Triomphant-class submarines, each capable of firing 16 
strategic-range nuclear missiles.  In addition, 20 Rafale aircraft equipped with ASMP can be 
used in a non-strategic, last warning-shot role.  France continues to refuse any assignment of 
these weapons to NATO. 
 The end of the Cold War also brought substantial changes to Britain’s non-strategic 
nuclear forces.  American TNWs made available under the “nuclear sharing” or dual-key 
arrangement were withdrawn from British forces in 1992 when Britain ceased to participate 
actively in the NATO arrangements under which it had access to American nuclear warheads. By 
2007, it removed the entire range of its WE-177 gravity and depth bombs.103  Since then, Britain 
has had only Trident nuclear missiles on its four nuclear-powered Vanguard-class submarines, 
capable of firing 16 missiles each, some of which can have reduced yields to enable a non-
strategic, last warning-shot role.   
 This means that other than the French ASMP, the only nuclear weapons for use in such a 
non-strategic role remaining in Europe today are American.  Amongst them are 180 B-61 nuclear 
free-fall – gravity – bombs with variable yields ranging from 0.3 to 340 kilotons, kept under 
American custody in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and the Middle Eastern NATO 
member, Turkey.  A variety of aircraft can transport them to target, including aircraft of all five 
countries plus, of course, the United States.  Under their “nuclear sharing” arrangements, 
Washington can still release them to its allies for use in a war.  The question is whether NATO 
consensus in general continues to favour this deployment of American NSNW in Europe, and 
whether in particular the five European NATO member states will want to continue to host and 
have access to them.104  
 With Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continuing tensions between Russia, 
NATO’s Eastern European members in the Baltic and Eastern Europe, the issue of NSNW in 
Europe is no longer dormant.  Russia’s deployment of nuclear capable Iskander-M short-range 
missiles into its enclave of Kaliningrad, sandwiched between Poland and the three Baltic states, 
would indicate that it sees a role for NSNW in Europe.105 What lessons Russia and NATO 
members have learnt from the Cold War dynamics analysed above remains to be seen. This is 
also true for North Korea and its neighbours, the Middle East, and India and Pakistan. 
 
Conclusion 
 The argument that one would not want to use nuclear weapons tactically so as not to 
destroy and irradiate what one wants to defend certainly has retained its force.  In the Cold War, 
Europeans argued for a “seamless garment” or an escalation ladder with all steps – but it used to 
be thought during the Cold War that more steps than just one were needed between conventional 
and strategic nuclear forces.  Since then, short-range – battlefield – nuclear forces have become 
taboo, eventually ruling out their usefulness for deterrence by denial. 
 The Suchy-Thayer argument that TNW/NSNW were needed in Europe to deter Soviet 
use of similar Theatre Nuclear Forces did not actually have much prominence in the Cold War.  
The reason was three-fold. First, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
had a significant conventional superiority over NATO and therefore did not need to take recourse 
to nuclear weapons to make gains on the ground. NATO clung to a first use option as Western 
strategists felt doubtful that NATO could fend off a concerted Warsaw Pact conventional attack.  
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Second, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in developing 
and later deploying such weapons.  Third, and from the mid-1970s, Brezhnev’s no-first-use 
pledge seemed to indicate that the Warsaw Pact would avoid, if possible, the use of nuclear 
weapons.  This argument of deterrence using Theatre Nuclear Forces, however, has gained 
considerable weight since the adoption by Russia of the nuclear-use-for-de-escalation doctrine.   
 Both Americans and Europeans have seen American nuclear forces deployed in Europe 
as symbols of American commitment, but many Europeans would have preferred European 
nuclear weapons.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rules that out for all states bar France and 
the United Kingdom, but the NPT was built on American and British commitments to European 
defence.  Britain’s nuclear force, shrunk to its four Trident submarines and likely to remain this 
way in its successor submarine force, does not contain any weapons systems that it can visibly 
deploy on allied territory.  France has such forces with its aircraft and air-launched ASMP 
missiles, but France has persistently refused to commit her forces to the defence of all NATO or 
WEU/EU allies in peacetime, and instead has hidden behind vague statements about the 
enhancement of European defence by the fact that French nuclear weapons are based in Europe 
(in fact all are based on French soil).106  This leaves the question of the continued stationing of 
American NSNW in Europe, a question that is bound to be central to the future security of 
NATO Europe, and to containing nuclear proliferation despite renewed anxieties about possible 
direct attacks on NATO territory.   
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